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Every criminal defendant in federal or state courtwho will be tried by a jury has the right to havethat jury selected from a fair cross-section of the
community. Every criminal defense attorney should be
equipped to enforce that cross-section right when it is in
the client’s best interest to do so. Part I of this article
explains the 16 things a defense attorney should know
about fair cross-section challenges, and Part II provides
a detailed analysis of two successful fair cross-section
claims.1
A defendant’s right to a jury selected from a fair
cross-section of the community is rooted in both the
Constitution and statutory authority: 
v First, the Sixth Amendment provides all criminal
defendants, in federal or state court, with the right to
an “impartial jury.”2 The Supreme Court has held
that “an essential component” of that right is “the
selection of a petit jury from a representative cross
section of the community.”3 After all, the purpose of
the jury is to ensure that the verdict reflects the voice
of the community, and the jury cannot serve that
purpose if distinctive groups in the community are
left out of the jury pool.4 All criminal defendants in
federal or state court therefore have a constitutional
right to be tried by a jury selected from a fair cross-
section of the community.
v Second, all litigants in federal court additionally have
a federal statutory right, under the Jury Selection and
Service Act of 1968 (JSSA)5 to “grand and petit juries
selected at random from a fair cross-section of the
community in the district or division wherein the
court convenes.”6
v Third, most litigants in state court have a similar state
statutory fair cross-section right.7
v Finally, many state constitutions also protect a crim-
inal defendant’s fair cross-section right.8
There is a significant amount of data indicating
that jury systems across the country underrepresent
people of color, primarily African-Americans and
Latinos.9 Defense attorneys can challenge this underrep-
resentation by raising a fair cross-section claim under
the Sixth Amendment, the JSSA, and parallel state con-
stitutions and statutes. 
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I. The 16 Things a Defense
Attorney Should Know
About Fair Cross-
Section Challenges
1. A defense attorney does not
need to see the jury before
raising a cross-section chal-
lenge; in fact, a client’s jury
is irrelevant to a cross-sec-
tion claim.
A peculiar aspect of the right to a
jury selected from a fair cross-section of
the community is that it extends to all
aspects of the jury selection process —
up until the point that an individual
petit jury is selected. The guarantee is
not that the particular jury hearing the
case reflect a cross-section of the com-
munity, but rather that “the jury
wheels, pools of names, panels or
venires from which juries are drawn
must not systematically exclude distinc-
tive groups in the community and
thereby fail to be reasonably representa-
tive thereof.”10
This means that the composition
of a client’s petit jury has no bearing on
the cross-section claim. Even if the
client’s particular jury includes African-
Americans, for example, in proportion
to the number of African-Americans in
the community, the client’s fair cross-
section claim is still viable.11 Similarly,
the fact that the jury does not include a
proportionate number of African-
Americans is not sufficient to demon-
strate a fair cross-section violation.12
Because one cannot tell by “look-
ing” at a jury whether the cross-section
right is being violated,13 it is important
for defense attorneys to request discov-
ery about the jury selection system in
advance of trial. The timing of cross-
section challenges and the entitlement
to discovery are discussed below.
2. The client does not need to
be a member of the under-
represented group.
There is no requirement that a
defendant raising a fair cross-section
claim must be a member of the group
allegedly excluded from jury service.14
3. The client can make a fair
cross-section challenge to the
system that selected the petit
jury, and/or the grand jury.
The fair cross-section requirement
of the JSSA applies to both the grand
and petit jury.15 The constitutional fair
cross-section requirement indisputably
applies to the petit jury,16 and some
courts have held that it applies to the
grand jury as well.17
4. Courts analyze fair cross-sec-
tion claims under the Sixth
Amendment and the JSSA
using the same standard.
Courts employ the same standard
(discussed at Number 9 below) to evalu-
ate fair cross-section claims under either
the Sixth Amendment or the JSSA.18
Courts typically use the same standard
when evaluating claims that arise under
state statutes and constitutions.19
5. A statutory violation may
exist even where there is no
constitutional cross-section
violation.
In addition to giving a defendant the
right to a jury selected from a fair cross-
section, the JSSA and many state statutes
also outline the manner in which jury
selection systems must operate.
Defendants are permitted to challenge the
jury selection process to the extent that it
substantially fails to operate in accor-
dance with the federal and/or state
statutes. 
Specifically, a defendant can “move
to dismiss the indictment or stay the
proceedings against him on the ground
of substantial failure to comply with the
provisions of [the JSSA] in selecting the
grand or petit jury.”20 A failure to com-
ply with the requirements of the JSSA is
“substantial” if it frustrates either of the
JSSA’s two basic goals: “(1) random
selection of jurors, and (2) determina-
tion of juror disqualification, excuses,
exemptions, and exclusions on the basis
of objective criteria.”21 Similarly, defen-
dants can challenge jury selection sys-
tems that substantially fail to comply
with state statues.22 Although this article
focuses only on vindicating the cross-
section right, it is important to note that
a defendant may have a claim under the
JSSA or comparable state statute even in
the absence of a cross-section viola-
tion.23
6. There are strict timing
requirements for statutory
cross-section claims, but not
for constitutional cross-sec-
tion claims. 
Under the JSSA, a criminal defen-
dant’s motion “to dismiss the indictment
or stay the proceedings against him on
the ground of substantial failure to com-
ply with the provisions of this title” must
be made “before the voir dire examina-
tion begins, or within seven days after the
defendant discovered or could have dis-
covered, by the exercise of diligence, the
grounds therefor, whichever is earlier.”24
The timing requirement of the JSSA has
been interpreted very strictly.25 State
statutes often have similar timing require-
ments.26
Constitutional fair cross-section
claims, however, are not required to meet
the seven-day JSSA standard, or the time-
liness requirements of state statutes.27
Instead, courts generally require constitu-
tional challenges to the selection of the
petit jury to be raised before trial, pur-
suant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 12(b) or state equivalent.28
There are grounds to argue that the fail-
ure to raise a challenge to the petit jury
pretrial should not constitute a waiver of
the claim,29 but they have largely been
unsuccessful.30 In any event, courts retain
the ability to grant relief from the waiver
for “good cause.”31
7. The defense does not need
to allege or prove discrimina-
tion at any point in a fair
cross-section claim; discrimi-
nation is irrelevant to a
cross-section claim.
Courts sometimes make the mis-
take of insisting defendants show dis-
crimination to establish a fair cross-
section claim.32 This is contrary to the
Sixth Amendment and well-estab-
lished Supreme Court doctrine.33
Defendants can certainly assert a sepa-
rate claim that the jury system has dis-
criminated in the selection of jurors in
violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
but that is a completely independent
claim for which the Supreme Court
has established a different standard.34
The Sixth Amendment fair cross-sec-
tion claim is not concerned with dis-
crimination; it is only concerned with
whether the system has produced a
representative jury pool, whether by
accident or design.35
As a result, it is no defense to a cross
section-challenge for jury officials to
assert that their policies are race neutral,
or that the system was not designed to
exclude, or that jury officials undertook
affirmative efforts to make the jury pool
representative, or that selection is done
by a computer, which is incapable of dis-
crimination.36 Each of these arguments
answers a question the Sixth
Amendment does not ask — was there
intentional discrimination in the jury
selection process. In the context of a fair
cross-section claim, inadvertent,
unknown, or benign decisions can
establish a constitutional violation.37
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8. In general, a substantive fair
cross-section claim must start
with a request for discovery.
Because the defense cannot tell by
looking at a jury whether the cross-sec-
tion right is being violated, it is almost
always necessary to request discovery
about the jury selection system. The ques-
tion in a cross-section claim is whether
steps in the jury selection process that
precede the selection of petit jurors fail to
include representative numbers of groups
in the community. Typically only the
court and jury selection system have
access to information about those prelim-
inary stages of the selection process.
Therefore, a defendant cannot substanti-
ate a cross-section claim without data
supplied through discovery.
The specific discovery requests that
defense counsel may wish to make are
discussed below (at Number 16), as they
are linked to the substantive showing the
court will demand from the defendant. It
may also be important for a defense attor-
ney to obtain or request funding for an
expert.38 In some cases, an expert in statis-
tics, computer programming, or jury sys-
tem operation will be necessary to ana-
lyze the jurisdiction’s jury data.39
9. There is no threshold showing
requirement to obtain discov-
ery in federal court and most
state courts.
The Supreme Court has made clear
that a defendant has a right to discovery if
preparing a motion to challenge the com-
position of the jury under the JSSA. No
other affirmative showing is required. A
similar standard applies to claims under
many state statutes, as well as to Sixth
Amendment claims.
Discovery Under the JSSA
The JSSA states: “The contents of
records or papers used by the jury com-
mission or clerk in connection with the
jury selection process shall not be dis-
closed, except … as may be necessary in
the preparation or presentation of a
motion” challenging the jury selection
process.40 The Act makes clear: “The par-
ties in a case shall be allowed to inspect,
reproduce, and copy such records or
papers at all reasonable times during the
preparation and pendency of such a
motion.”41
The Supreme Court has accordingly
held that under the JSSA, “a litigant has
essentially an unqualified right to
inspect” jury selection records.42 “This
right is virtually absolute: the only limita-
tion on this right of access is that the
inspection must be done at ‘reasonable
times.’”43 Every federal circuit court to
consider the issue — the First, Second,
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth,
Ninth, and Tenth — has likewise con-
cluded that a litigant has an essentially
unqualified right to inspect the records or
papers used by the jury commission or
clerk in connection with the jury selec-
tion process.44 The federal case law makes
clear that, “[t]o avail himself of the right
of access to jury selection records, a liti-
gant need only allege that he is preparing
a motion to challenge the jury selection
process.”45 The unqualified nature of a lit-
igant’s discovery right means that a “court
may not premise the grant or denial of a
motion to inspect upon a showing of
probable success on the merits of a chal-
lenge to the jury selection provisions.”46
Neither may a court “require a defendant
requesting access to jury selection records
to submit with that request ‘a sworn state-
ment of facts which, if true, would consti-
tute a substantial failure to comply with
the provisions of [the Act].’”47 “Since the
appellants’ right to inspection [i]s
unqualified, whether or not the accompa-
nying affidavit establishe[s] a prima facie
case of defective jury selection process is
of no import.”48 In short, a “court is not
free to establish additional requirements
that defendants must meet in order to
gain access to jury selection records.”49
Discovery Under State Statutes
Many states have jury selection
statutes that, similarly to the JSSA, require
disclosure of records to defendants who
are preparing a challenge to the jury
selection system.50 Pursuant to most of
those state statutes — as is true under the
JSSA — there is no threshold require-
ment that a defendant needs to satisfy
before obtaining discovery.51
For example, the D.C. Jury Act pro-
vides for disclosure of “records or lists
used in connection with the selection
process … in connection with the prepa-
ration or presentation of a motion” chal-
lenging the jury selection process.52 In an
en banc case before the D.C. Court of
Appeals, the U.S. Attorney’s Office had
asserted that the statute required the
defendant to make a threshold showing
before getting access to that discovery.53
The Court of Appeals, however, held it
was “unwilling to import into the statute
[a] threshold showing requirement that
movants would have to satisfy before
obtaining access to materials.” 54 As the
court explained, even a modest threshold
showing requirement “forc[es] a litigant
to put the proverbial cart before the
horse” because it requires “the litigant to
prove — or prove to a lesser degree — the
merits of his or her constitutional claims
in order to garner access to the nonpublic
and confidential information necessary
to prove the merits of his or her claim.”55
Discovery Under the Federal 
And State Constitutions
Although there is little case law on
point, there is also a right to discovery in
the context of a constitutional claim —
because the substantive fair cross-section
right is meaningless without an entitle-
ment to discovery. When the Supreme
Court found an “essentially unqualified
right” of discovery under the JSSA, the
Court looked at the statute’s purpose in
addition to the text: “an unqualified right
to inspection is required not only by the
plain text of the statute, but also by the
statute’s overall purpose of insuring
‘grand and petit juries selected at random
from a fair cross section of the communi-
ty.’”56 Because the Sixth Amendment
shares the same purpose — to guarantee
juries selected from a fair cross-section of
the community — it follows a defendant
raising a constitutional challenge is also
entitled to discovery.
As the Supreme Court explained,
“Without inspection, a party almost
invariably would be unable to determine
whether he has a potentially meritorious
jury challenge.”57 The right to challenge
the jury is empty without an attendant
right to discovery, because “[i]t would be
virtually impossible for defendants who
are endeavoring to ascertain if a success-
ful attack on the grand [or petit] jury
selection process can be advanced if the
facts necessary to prove a defect in the
selection process are withheld.”58 Only
after such discovery is granted will defen-
dants “be in a position to make informed
decisions as to whether the jury selection
process warrants challenge and as to
whether they prefer trial by a representa-
tive jury or before the court.”59
Just as the Supreme Court recog-
nized that the cross-section purpose gives
rise to a discovery right, so too have the
few courts that have considered the ques-
tion of discovery independent of the JSSA
or similar state statute.60 For example, the
Supreme Court of Missouri granted a
defendant’s request for disclosure of jury
list data on purely constitutional
grounds.61 After noting that “Missouri is
not bound by [the JSSA] and has no such
state legislation,” the court concluded that
it “is bound, however, by the United States
Supreme Court’s determination of a state
court defendant’s constitutional right to
have his case considered by a grand jury
drawn from a fair cross-section of his
community.”62 Discovery was necessary
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because “[t]his cross-section requirement
would be without meaning if a defendant
were denied all means of discovery in an
effort to assert that right.”63
10. After obtaining discovery, the
defense must establish a
prima facie violation of the
fair cross-section right under
Duren v. Missouri.
The standard for a Sixth
Amendment fair cross-section claim was
established in Duren v. Missouri,64 and
reaffirmed in 2010 in Berghuis v. Smith.65
Understanding the Duren test is critical
to understanding what discovery to
request: the information to which a
defendant is entitled is directly linked to
the substantive showing the defendant is
required to make under Duren. 
Under Duren, a criminal defendant
alleging a cross-section violation must
satisfy a three-prong prima facie test by
showing that (1) “the group alleged to be
excluded [from the jury system] is a ‘dis-
tinctive’ group in the community,” (2)
“the representation of this group in
venires from which juries are selected is
not fair and reasonable in relation to the
number of such persons in the commu-
nity,” and (3) “this underrepresentation
is due to systematic exclusion of the
group in the jury-selection process.”66 If
the defendant establishes these three
prongs, he or she has established a prima
facie violation of the fair cross-section
right, and the burden shifts to the gov-
ernment to show “attainment of a fair
cross section to be incompatible with a
significant state interest.”67
11. The first prong of the Duren
test requires the defendant to
identify a distinctive group.
The group that a defendant claims is
not fairly represented in the jury pool
must be a “distinctive” group in the com-
munity.68 Courts routinely recognize that
African-Americans, women, and Latinos
are distinctive groups.69
Distinctiveness is an open-ended
category that could arguably include any
group where there is, as the Tenth Circuit
described it, “(1) the presence of some
quality or attribute which defines and
limits the group (2) a cohesiveness of atti-
tudes or ideas or experiences which dis-
tinguishes the group from the general
social milieu, and (3) a community of
interest which may not be represented by
other segments of society.”70 Accordingly,
some courts have recognized that groups
such as Native Americans, Jews, and
Asians are distinctive groups.71 In general,
however, courts have been reluctant to
define groups other than African-
Americans, Latinos, and women as dis-
tinctive.72
12. The second prong of the
Duren test requires the
defendant to demonstrate a
disparity between the num-
ber of distinctive group
members in the community
and in the jury pool.
The essential claim in a fair cross-
section challenge is that a distinctive
group in the community, such as
African-Americans, is not sufficiently
represented in the jury pool. The second
Duren prong requires the defendant to
identify the amount of this disparity —
just how big of a difference is there
between African-Americans in the com-
munity as compared to African-
Americans in the jury pool? 
Identifying the Number of Distinctive
Group Members in the Community
The Supreme Court has relied on
census data of the total population
when determining the percentage of
distinctive group members in the com-
munity.73 Although some courts have
concluded that it is not inconsistent
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with Supreme Court case law to consid-
er the 18-and-older population,74 courts
have generally recognized that the
“community” is properly measured with
total population data from the census,75
as “the Supreme Court’s acceptance of
comparisons using total population fig-
ures clearly indicates that a defendant is
not required to gather data reflecting
the age-eligible population of the dis-
tinctive group in question.”76
Even courts that have identified
the 18 and older population as the cor-
rect comparison have explicitly reject-
ed the suggestion that the numbers be
further narrowed to exclude persons
who would be ineligible for jury service
for reasons other than age.77 Courts
have rejected the demand for jury-eli-
gible population data because such
data are difficult to obtain,78 often
unreliable,79 and — most importantly
— such a requirement is inconsistent
with Supreme Court precedent.80
Identifying the Number of Distinctive
Group Members in the Jury Pool
There is no one single definition of
the “jury pool” to which census data must
be compared. 
The Supreme Court has made clear
that “jury wheels, pools of names, panels,
or venires from which juries are drawn
must not systematically exclude distinc-
tive groups in the community and there-
by fail to be reasonably representative
thereof.”81 In other words, a defendant can
establish the second Duren prong by
showing a disparity between the number
of African-Americans in the community
and the number on the master list of all
jurors, or by showing a disparity between
the number of African-Americans in the
community and the number who showed
up to court for jury service and thereby
became members of jury venires, or
between the number of African-
Americans in the community and the
number at any other stage of the jury
process (other than the petit jury). 
The limiting principle is that Duren’s
second prong cannot be established by
demonstrating the disparity between the
number of African-Americans in the
community and the number on a single
venire or jury panel. The rationale is that
a single venire or panel is such a small
sample that its make-up could be the
product of happenstance, rather than a
reflection of the operation of the jury
selection system.82 As mentioned above
(at Number 1), this limitation means that
an attorney should not wait until seeing
the venire at the start of trial to raise a fair
cross-section claim. Race data from more
than one venire, however, can be suffi-
cient to establish a disparity at Duren’s
second prong. 
13. There are multiple ways to
measure disparity, and the
Supreme Court has declined
to decide which method
must be used.
The Supreme Court held in 2010
that “[n]either Duren nor any other deci-
sion of this Court specifies the method or
tests courts must use to measure the rep-
resentativeness of distinct groups in jury
pools.”83 There are at least four possible
methods or tests that could be used:
absolute disparity, comparative disparity,
standard deviation analysis, and proba-
bility analysis.84 In practice, courts usually
apply the absolute and comparative dis-
parity tests.
Absolute Disparity
“Absolute disparity in the jury selec-
tion context is defined as the difference
between the percentage of a certain pop-
ulation group eligible for jury duty and
the percentage of that group who actually
appear in the venire.”85 In other words, if
80 percent of people in the district from
which jurors are drawn are African-
Americans and 20 percent of people on
the jury venire are African-Americans,
then the absolute disparity is 60 percent. 
Mathematically, absolute disparity 
is expressed as follows:
If x is the population propor-
tion and y is the proportion on
the jury venire, both expressed
in percent, then absolute dispar-
ity = x − y in percent. 
Example: In Berghuis v. Smith,
African-Americans made up 7.28 percent
of the community population (x) and 6
percent of the jury venire (y), so the
absolute disparity was 1.28 percent.
Most courts start by considering the
absolute disparity figure, even where they
also consider comparative disparity.86 A
few jurisdictions use only the absolute
disparity test.87 But as many courts have
recognized, the absolute disparity meas-
ure is problematic when the relevant
population is a small proportion of the
total population88 — “because the small-
er the population, the less striking the
numerical differences appear.”89 For
example, if Latinos make up five percent
of the community population, the
absolute disparity will never be higher
than five percent — even if they are never
summoned for jury service. In light of
the tendency of the absolute test to
obscure critical disparities, many courts
have declined to rely solely on the
absolute disparity test.90
Comparative Disparity
The comparative disparity measure
attempts to addresses the “small popula-
tion” problem described above because
it takes into account the proportion of
the group in the community population.
It is “calculated by dividing the absolute
disparity by the population figure for a
population group … and measures the
diminished likelihood that members of
an underrepresented group, when com-
pared to the population as a whole, will
be called for jury service.”91 Thus it is
“more likely to register the underrepre-
sentation of smaller groups.”92 For exam-
ple, if Latinos make up five percent of
the community population, but only
two percent of the jury pool, then the
comparative disparity is 60 percent. In
other words, Latinos are 60 percent “less
likely, when compared to the overall
jury-eligible population, to be on the
jury-service list.”93
Mathematically, comparative 
disparity is expressed as follows:
Comparative disparity figures have
also been criticized because “they too are
distorted by the small population of the
different minority groups.”94 While the
absolute test can understate disparities, the
comparative test can, in some cases, over-
state them. The best approach for accom-
modating the imperfections in the tests is
to consider the results of both methods.95
Standard Deviation Analysis 
And Probability Analysis
“Standard deviation analysis seeks
to determine the probability that the
disparity between a group’s jury-eligi-
ble population and the group’s percent-
age in the qualified jury pool is attrib-
utable to random chance.”96 In other
words, “the more standard deviations
the lower the probability the result is a
random one.”97 The standard deviation
method is closely related to a statistical
significance test, which calculates the
probability of the observed underrepre-
sentation or greater underrepresenta-
tion if the protected group were repre-
sented in jury venires in accordance
with its proportion of the population.98
As a result, it depends on the sample
size, n, of jurors in the venires whose
race was determined. 
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Mathematically, standard deviation 
is expressed as follows:
Example: Substituting the
Berghuis numbers, (except for
n), yields 
Hence, for example, if n = 100, the
standard deviations would be .49; if n
were 1666, then the number of standard
deviations would be 
n), yields 
A higher standard deviation (like
2.0) means that the racial disparity in a
jury system is less likely to be random; it
is more likely to be the result of the oper-
ation of the jury selection system. A lower
standard deviation (like .49) suggests that
any disparity in the sample is more likely
the result of random chance. Although
there is no official threshold, “[a]s a gen-
eral rule … if the difference between the
expected value and the observed number
is greater than two or three standard devi-
ations, then the hypothesis that the jury
drawing was random would be suspect to
a social scientist.”99
Probability analysis is another
method that is sometimes used to explain
the impact of underrepresentation on
small cognizable classes. Probability
analysis calculates the probability of hav-
ing at least one member of the class on a
jury of size 12, both from a representative
system and from the current system.
Example: Using the Berghuis
data, the probability that a single
jury-eligible person is not
African-American is 1 − .0728 =
0.9282. The probability that
none of the 12 randomly selected
members of a potential jury are
African-American is then 0.9282
raised to the 12th power, which is
0.40, so the probability of at least
one African-American on the
jury is 1 − 0.40 = .60. However, in
the system as it exists, the proba-
bility of at least one African-
American on the jury is 0.94
raised to the 12th power, which is
0.48. Consequently, the probabil-
ity of at least one African-
American on the jury is 0.52. 
In other words, if the jury system
were representative of the community, the
probability that there would be an
African-American on the jury is .60. But
the actual numbers reflect that the proba-
bility that an African-American will be on
the jury is only .52. This means that the
operation of the jury selection system may
be reducing the probability of African-
American representation on the jury. 
Standard deviations are affected by
the size of the sample. Because the stan-
dard deviation method is dependent on
the sample size, when the sample is
small, significance will not be found,
while if the sample is large, significance
will be found. Thus, in a sense what is
being measured by the standard devia-
tion measure has more to do with the
sample size than with the degree to
which the protected group is underrep-
resented in the jury venire. Similarly, the
probability that at least one member of
the protected group is on the jury can be
a sensitive measure for small protected
groups, but not for large ones. Since
defendants do not have a right to have a
protected group member on their jury,
the legal relevance of this measure is
unclear. Courts that have used either
standard deviation or probability analy-
sis have done so only in conjunction
with other methods.100
14. There is no official threshold
for the amount of disparity
that is ‘enough’ to satisfy
Duren’s second prong.
The Supreme Court has never speci-
fied what degree of disparity is sufficient
to establish Duren’s second prong. Courts
have frequently borrowed the standard
from equal protection cases that a dispar-
ity of less than 10 percent is not enough
to establish a constitutional violation, but
defense attorneys should not acquiesce to
the adoption of the 10 percent measure
for several reasons. 
First, in 2010 the Supreme Court
declined to address the government’s
proposal that the Court adopt the 10
percent standard for fair cross-section
cases.101 Second, as the Supreme Court
noted, using the 10 percent standard
would mean there is “no remedy for
complete exclusion of distinct groups in
communities where the population of
the distinct group falls below the 10 per-
cent threshold.”102 Finally, the 10 percent
figure is borrowed from equal protection
cases where the standard for the degree
of disparity is arguably higher than in
cross-section cases.103
Indeed, courts have held that Duren’s
second prong is satisfied where the dispar-
ity was less than 10 percent.104 That said,
some courts have declined to hold that
there was a sufficient disparity when the
disparity was even more significant.105
15. The third prong of the Duren
test requires the defendant to
demonstrate that the dispari-
ty is due to systematic exclu-
sion of the distinctive group.
The third prong of the Duren test
requires the defendant to show that the
underrepresentation is “due to systematic
exclusion of the group in the jury-selec-
tion process,” by showing that “the cause
of the underrepresentation was systemat-
ic — that is, inherent in the particular
jury-selection process utilized.”106 In
Duren, the Court held that the fact that “a
large discrepancy occurred not just occa-
sionally, but in every weekly venire for a
period of nearly a year manifestly indi-
cates that the cause of the underrepresen-
tation was systemic.”107
This language from Duren implies
that the existence of a disparity over time
is sufficient to show that a disparity is
“systematic,” and some courts have inter-
preted it this way.108 But other courts have
required defendants to demonstrate with
more specificity which stage of the jury
system caused the disparity. And in 2010
the Supreme Court arguably departed
from Duren’s emphasis on the duration
of the disparity in Berghuis v. Smith.109
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Although the Berghuis Court adopted the
fair cross-section standard exactly as it
was articulated in Duren,110 the analysis
suggests111 that a more particularized
showing of the cause of the disparity is
required.112
As a result, defense attorneys should
request discovery about each stage of the
jury selection system, and not just demo-
graphic data about the venires.113 Racial
and ethnic disparities can result from acci-
dental or benign actions of the jury selec-
tion office, such as the unintended results
of computer programs,114 the numeric
increment used to randomly select jurors
from the jury pool,115 the use of telephones
to summon jurors,116 or benign efforts to
send jurors to courthouses closer to their
homes.117 Jury offices also produce unrep-
resentative jury lists when they rely on
voter registration lists that are themselves
unrepresentative, but courts have general-
ly rejected fair cross-section claims based
on this factor.118
16. Discovery in cross-section
claims includes all jury
selection materials relevant
to the claim. 
“The right to inspection extends to
all jury selection materials relevant to a
complete determination of whether a
grand or petit jury has in fact been select-
ed at random from a fair cross-section of
the community.”119
Pursuant to defendants’ broad dis-
covery rights, courts routinely require jury
selection systems to disclose a great deal of
information and data.120 Perhaps most
obviously, jury systems are required to
disclose demographic information
regarding the distinctive groups at issue.
Courts consistently order the release of
race, ethnicity, and gender data for each
stage of the jury selection process, for
“without the demographic information” a
defendant has “no way to prove the under-
representation of identifiable groups.”121
Importantly, when a jury selection
system has failed to collect the relevant
demographic data, courts typically order
the disclosure of information from which
racial, ethnic, and gender data can be
gleaned. For example, the critical impor-
tance of providing defendants with “rea-
sonable access to accurate information
concerning the race and ethnicity of
prospective jurors” is illustrated by cases
authorizing disclosure of completed juror
questionnaires when those forms include
race and ethnicity data.122 Indeed, courts
regularly allow defendants access to oth-
erwise confidential jury questionnaires,123
and have even permitted defense teams to
contact jurors directly to collect race and
ethnicity information when that data was
not otherwise available.124
Courts also routinely order the dis-
closure of the master jury wheels (lists or
databases that include the total popula-
tion of potential jurors),125 and the quali-
fied jury wheels (lists or databases of
jurors to be summoned for a particular
venire),126 including the names on jury
lists.127 In many cases examination of these
lists is required to determine whether
duplicates are being properly eliminated
“[b]ecause duplication of names affects
the randomness of selection.”128
Courts additionally require the dis-
closure of data and documents related to
excuses, deferrals, or disqualifications.129
These aspects of a jury system introduce
the opportunity for the exercise of discre-
tion, which is at odds with the principle
of random selection. “The continuing
power to excuse prospective jurors on the
grounds of suitability and undue hard-
ship is highly discretionary in nature, and
courts must be alert to prevent its
abuse.”130 Courts also typically order dis-
closure of data and documents related to
the summonsing process and responses
to summons,131 and of other types of jury
selection records, such as information
about proposed changes to the jury sys-
tem.132 Finally, courts frequently order
jury system administrators to participate
in depositions designed to improve the
defendant’s understanding of the jury
selection system.133
Many disclosures required by courts
involve the release of jurors’ personal
information, as the privacy interests of
jurors do not outweigh the constitutional
and statutory rights of defendants.
Indeed, courts have granted access to a
broad range of jury selection materials
— concluding that while jury records
“contain sensitive, personal informa-
tion,”134 “[t]he right to a trial before a jury
representing a fair cross section of the
community is a critical constitutional
protection and should be scrupulously
honored by providing defendants with
reasonable access to accurate informa-
tion concerning the race and ethnicity of
prospective jurors.”135 Instead of limiting
the release of information, courts have
concluded that respect for the privacy
interests of jurors warrants the imposi-
tion of a protective order — the proper
tool for managing discovery of sensitive
information.136 For although the privacy
issues related to discovery are not imma-
terial, they cannot be wielded to deny a
defendant “access to the very materials
containing the information necessary to
the filing of a motion” asserting a fair
cross-section challenge.137
Finally, although not well
publicized,138 each federal district court is
required to fill out and keep on file Form
AO-12, which compares the gender, race,
and ethnic status of persons who return
questionnaires and are on the qualified
wheel with the percentages of those
groups in the community.139 Because this
is the information that would be needed
for a jury challenge, a request for the 
AO-12 and its supporting documentation
should be part of the initial discovery
request in federal court.140 Unfortunately,
some courts fail to produce timely
reports141 and some courts’ AO-12 forms
also have a large proportion of missing
entries for race and ethnicity data.142
After obtaining this information, a
defense attorney will be equipped to argue
that the three elements of Duren’s prima
facie test have been met. The burden will
then shift to the government to attempt to
prove that the disparity is justified because
it “manifestly and primarily” advances “a
significant state interest.”143
II. Examples of Successful
Fair Cross-Section Claims
Example 1: 
Anzania v. State of Indiana144
Zolo Anzania (formerly Rufus
Averhart) was convicted of killing a police
officer, George Yaros, in the course of a
bank robbery, and was sentenced to
death.145 This sentence was overturned on
grounds unrelated to the jury,146 and he
was sentenced to death a second time in
1996.147 Mr. Anzania made a timely fair
cross-section challenge to the 1996 jury
that imposed the death sentence.148
There had been speculation in the
local press that there was something odd
about the jury venires of Allen County,
where Mr. Anzania’s trial took place. Some
local defense attorneys speculated that
perhaps certain areas in Wayne Township,
one of the townships in Allen County,
were being excluded. There were reports
that computer programs had been fixed,
but nothing had been made public. 
Dr. Joseph Kadane, co-author of this
article, was hired by the defense as their
statistician. It turned out that the original
computer programs had been written in
COBOL, an old language rarely used for
new programs. Dr. Kadane was given a
COBOL expert with whom to work and
the defense attorneys conducted extensive
depositions of jury managers and com-
puter personnel to understand the system
as it existed in 1996.
The first clue that something was
wrong with the jury selection process
WWW. N A C D L . O R G                                                                         T H E  C H A M P I O N20
F
A
IR
 C
R
O
S
S
-
S
E
C
T
IO
N
 C
H
A
L
L
E
N
G
E
S
was that the system always drew more
potential jurors than requested. When
asked for a list of 10,000, it produced
10,528, for example. When the COBOL
program was examined, it turned out
there was a systematic reason for this.
The program divided the voter list (the
sole source list used) by the number of
jurors requested (say 10,000). This typ-
ically resulted in a number that is not
an integer, say 15.37. In order to assure
that enough jurors were being sum-
moned, this number would be rounded
down to 15, and the jurors would be
divided into groups of 15, one of
whom would be selected. Thus, if the
integer were k, this program would
produce a list of at least the number k,
and as many as a factor of 1/k more.
The program also ordered the list
alphabetically by township, and within
township by street address, and sent
the result to a second program. Because
Wayne Township is last alphabetically,
all its prospective jurors were at the
bottom of this alphabetized list. Table 1
gives the number of jurors requested in
the relevant years.
Table 1. Jury Draws for Allen 
County, 1994 to 1996
Year Request Size of draw Excess
1994 10,000 10,528 528
1995 12,000 12,693 693
1996 14,000 14,365 365
It is estimated that Allen County
had 150,000 voters in this period. If so,
the values of k that result would be 15,
12 and 10, so the overage could have
been as high as 666 in 1994, 1000 in
1995, and 1400 in 1996. The excesses in
these years are less than these upper
bounds. The second program had an
input tape with a random permutation
of 10,000 numbers on it. These num-
bers were used to control which persons
were put in which quarterly draw. Only
the top 10,000 on the alphabetized list
of sampled voters would be assigned to
quarterly draws. What impact might
this have had on prospective jurors
from Wayne Township? To give some
background on this question, Table 2
gives data from the 1990 census about
the population of Allen County, and
1995 registration data. 
Thus Wayne Township had
88,671/217,332 = 40.8% of the over 18
population of Allen County, but only
34.9% of the registered voters. The choice
not to supplement the voters list with
other source lists, such as the list of driv-
ers, results in a reduction in Wayne
Township’s participation in juries.
Table 2. 1990 Census and 1995 Registration
Data for Allen County, Indiana
Area 1990 1995 
Population registered
aged 18+ voters
Wayne Township 88,671 55,136
Rest of Allen County 128,661 102,778
Total Allen County 217,332 157,914
A random sample of size 14,365 of
the voter’s list in Allen County should
result in approximately (14,365) × (.349)
= 5013 from Wayne Township. Because
all of these potential jurors would be at
the bottom of the list, only 5013 -4365 =
648 would actually be assigned to quar-
terly draws, and hence be in jury venires.
Hence, Wayne Township’s proportion of
Allen County’s juries is reduced to
648/10,000 = 6.5%. What implications
might the underrepresentation of Wayne
Township on jury venires have for Mr.
Anzania’s legal rights? 
The most direct route might seem to
be that the residents of Wayne Township
constitute a cognizable class, but courts
generally have not recognized residents of
a particularly geographic area as “distinc-
tive” groups. There were two more solid
grounds to challenge this jury, however.
The first was the statutory requirement
that jury selection be proportional to the
population in each Commissioner dis-
trict. The 1990 census data for the three
Commissioner districts in Allen County
are given in Table 3. These numbers are
the whole population, not the over 18
population, as this is the way the Indiana
statute is worded. Then the districts
would have representation given in the
last column of Table 4. There is here a
strong case that Commissioner District 3,
which has 32.9% of the population of
Allen County, but only 15.5% of the jury
venire, is underrepresented, violating the
Indiana statute. 
Table 3. 1990 Census Population of
Commissioner Districts
Commissioner Wayne Non- Total Proportion
District Township Wayne
1 13,277 88,221 101,448 33.7%
2 28,969 71.576 100,545 33.4%
3 73,808 25,033 98,841 32.9%
Table 4. Proportional Representation of
Commissioner Districts on Juries
Districts Proportional Representation Proportion
1 13,227(.065) + 88,221(.935) = 83,346 46.2%
2 28,969(.065) + 71,576(.935) = 68,807 38.2%
3 73,808(.065) + 25,033(.935) = 28,203 15.6%
The second ground on which to chal-
lenge Mr. Anzania’s jury venire was that
African-Americans were underrepresent-
ed in a manner that violated his right to a
jury drawn from a cross-section of the
community. According to the 1990 census,
there were 13,937 African-Americans in
Wayne Township 18 years of age or more,
and 4,615 in other townships in Allen
County, for a total of 18,552. Hence,
among the African-Americans at least 18
years and older, 75.1% live in Wayne
Township. If the Allen County jury system
represented African-Americans in accor-
dance with numbers among those 18 and
older, the jury venires would have
18,552/217,332 = 8.5% African-
Americans. Taking the data from 1996
and the jury system in place at the time,
the proportion of African-Americans in
the jury venire would be expected to be 
Applying the measures of unrepre-
sentativeness, the absolute disparity is
.085 − .044 = 4.1%, and the relative dis-
parity is .044/.085 = 48.2%. Thus, an
African-American has slightly over half of
the probability of appearing on a jury
venire that they would have in a random
system. The probability that at least one
African-American would be on a ran-
domly chosen jury is 
1 − (1 − .085)12 = .66 = 66%,
while that probability given the sys-
tem as it operated in 1996 is 
1 − (1 − .044)12 = .417 = 41.7%.149
The test of significance makes no
sense in this context in that we already
know that the jury system does not pro-
duce a random sample of the population.
The hearing was held before a judge
who had participated in the supervision
of the jury system, and who declined to
recuse himself.150 This illustrates one of
the difficulties of bringing a jury chal-
lenge. Often in such cases a judge is asked
to rule on the legal adequacy of either his
own work, as in this case, or the work of a
friend and colleague. 
The Indiana Supreme Court ulti-
mately vacated the death sentence in a
three to two decision. The majority opin-
ion ignored the issue of underrepresenta-
tion in Commission districts,151 but held
the racial disparity violated the state
statute.152 The opinion made it clear that
the decision rested in part on the “‘quali-
tative difference of death from all other
punishments,’” which “‘requires a corre-
spondingly greater degree of scrutiny of
the capital sentencing determination.’”153
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Example 2: 
State of New Jersey v. Long154
The state charged Mr. Long with cap-
ital murder, armed robbery, and weapons
offenses.155 There had been puzzlement for
some time among the defense bar because
of the seeming ethnic homogeneity of
venires: there would be a predominately
Jewish venire, a mainly Italian one, etc.
Mr. Long initiated a jury challenge.156 The
challenge, similarly to the claim in
Anzania v. Indiana, concerned the use of
systematic sampling interacting badly
with the ordering of persons on the list. 
The jury challenge in Long was
upheld. What were the facts that led to a
successful challenge? The jury system
used both voter and driver lists as sources,
which led to 180,000 names. However, the
census found 130,000 people in Atlantic
County between the ages of 18 and 74.
Thus, at least 50,000 people were listed
twice and this duplication was not identi-
fied by the merging program. Having
been listed twice, these persons would
have twice the chance of being selected by
a random process, compared to persons
listed only once. The resulting list is
ordered alphabetically by last name.
The jury manager decides on the
number of jurors required. The yield, i.e.,
the number of jurors that have to be sum-
moned to yield a juror who actually
serves, is believed to be four. The list
length is divided by the number of jurors
required, yielding an interval number k.
Then every kth juror in the alphabetized
list is summoned, yielding one-fourth of
the number that have to be summoned.
Successive runs through the list are made
by adding to k respectively 39, 41 and 43.
The result of the proximity of the num-
bers 39, 41 and 43 and the alphabetical
order of the list is that persons with the
same last names are more likely to be
summoned together than would be the
case under a system in which jurors were
chosen independently and equally likely.
After ineligibles are eliminated, and
grand jurors selected out (again by sys-
tematic sampling), the names are
reordered according to the fifth letter of
the last name, the fourth character of the
address and the second character of the
driver’s license. A judge or designee then
names a number to be used as the interval
for a systematic sample. Asked to choose
a number between 1 and 99, 42 out of 54
times a number less than 10 was selected.
A small interval number causes per-
sons close in the reorganized list to be
chosen. Since persons in the same family
have the same last name and address, they
will tend to be selected to appear on the
same panels. For example, out of a total of
4,366 qualified jurors, there were 146
pairs (i.e., 292 people) with another fam-
ily member on the list. There were also
two triples and one quadruple. The prob-
ability of such coincidences under a truly
random selection is miniscule.
The appeals court found a statutory
violation, and concluded, “It is vital that
juries be selected in a manner wholly free
from taint and suspicion. … In capital
cases this responsibility is of the deepest
concern possible and may be said to be
imbedded in the natural law.”157
Conclusion
Every criminal defendant who has
the right to a jury has the right to have
that jury selected from a fair cross-section
of the community. In turn, defendants are
entitled to information about the jury
selection system so that they can deter-
mine whether their constitutional rights
are being violated. As cross-section viola-
tions are often an invisible injury — one
cannot “see” it by looking at an individual
jury — it can only be exposed by the dis-
covery requests of defense attorneys. 
The authors welcome any feedback
from readers, including suggestions,
questions, or updates on fair cross-sec-
tion cases. The authors would also like to
acknowledge the research assistance of
Aisha Dennis, Samuel Litton, Vanessa
Garcia, and Em Lawler.
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(same); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 1214 (same);
MD. CODE ANN CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-409 (same);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.1354 (same); MINN. GEN.
R. PRAC. 813(a) (same); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-
09.1-12(1) (same); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 
§ 633A (same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-1-113(2)
(same); MO. REV. STAT. § 494.465(1) (same); OR.
REV. STAT. § 136.005(1) (party can challenge
“material departure”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 23A-19-3 (same); W. VA. CODE § 52-1-15(a)
(same).
23. See, e.g., Calabrese, 942 F.2d at 229
(substantial violation of the JSSA where
excusal of a significant number of jurors
based on knowledge of defendants was “not
based on one of the Act’s enumerated
grounds”); Hudson v. State, 248 S.W.3d 56, 57,
60 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008) (reversing conviction
because “jury selection process substantially
failed to comply with [defendant’s state]
statutory right to a trial by randomly select-
ed jury members” where the “process was
intended to be random, but an error in the
software caused venire panels to be seated
in reverse chronological order with regard to
age, or ‘oldest-to-youngest.’”).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1867(a) (emphasis
added). The motion must contain “a sworn
statement of facts which, if true, would con-
stitute a substantial failure to comply with
the provisions of [the JSSA].” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1867(d). The defendant is also entitled to
present any relevant evidence in support of
the motion. Id.
25. See, e.g., United States v. Bearden, 659
F.2d 590, 595 (5th Cir. 1981) (The “timeliness
requirement … is to be strictly construed,
and failure to comply precisely with its terms
forecloses a challenge under the Act.”). There
is some suggestion that noncompliance
with the timing requirement might be over-
looked if “the [JSSA] and the jury selection
procedures utilized by the district court
effectively foreclosed the filing of appellants’
motion at an earlier time.” United States v.
DeFries, 129 F.3d 1293, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1997);
see also United States v. Brown, 128 F. Supp. 2d
1034, 1039 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (interpreting
JSSA timing requirement more leniently).
26. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-71-139
(“The written motion shall be filed prior to
the swearing in of the jury selected to try the
case.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-19-4 (same);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-1-113(1) (same); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 4512(a) (jury challenge
must be filed “[w]ithin 7 days after the mov-
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ing party discovers, or by the exercise of dili-
gence could have discovered, the grounds
therefor, and in any event before the jury is
sworn to try the case”); MINN. GEN. R. PRAC.
813(a) (same); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-09.1-12(1)
(same); W. VA. CODE § 52-1-15(a) (same); 725
ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/114-3(a) (“Any objection to
the manner in which a jury panel has been
selected or drawn shall be raised by a
motion to discharge the jury panel prior to
the voir dire examination.”); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 136.005(2) (same); see also HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 612-23(a); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 2-213(1); IND.
CODE § 33-28-5-21(a); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14
§ 1214; MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-
409(b)(1) (challenge must be made “[b]efore
examination begins in a criminal case or, for
good cause shown, after a jury is sworn but
before it receives evidence”); MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 494.465(1) (“Such motion may be made at
any time before the petit jury is sworn to try
the case or within 14 days after the moving
party discovers or by the exercise of reason-
able diligence could have discovered the
grounds therefor, whichever occurs later.”).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 822
F.2d 1234, 1239 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[D]efendants’
failure to comply with the provisions of the
Jury Selection Act does not preclude them
from raising a constitutional challenge to
the makeup of the venire, based on the Sixth
Amendment.”); see also United States v.
Grisham, 63 F.3d 1074, 1077 (11th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Hawkins, 566 F.2d 1006, 1014
(5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Marrapese, 610
F. Supp. 991, 997-98 (D.R.I. 1985); United
States v. Layton, 519 F. Supp. 946, 952 (D. Cal.
1981); United States v. Marcano, 508 F. Supp.
462, 465 n.4 (D.P.R. 1980); State v. Watkins, 463
N.W.2d 411, 413 (Iowa 1990). 
28. See, e.g., United States v. Ovalle, 136
F.3d 1092, 1108 (6th Cir. 1998) (“Objections
to the seating of the grand or petit jury must
be filed before trial under [Rule] 12(b)(2).”);
United States v. Avila, 1992 WL 75236, at *8
(9th Cir. Apr. 16, 1992) (Rule 12(b) “forecloses
objections to the petit jury array that are not
made prior to trial.”); see also Shotwell Mfg.
Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341, 362 (1963)
(not abuse of discretion to deny challenges
to jury selection process raised for the first
time more than four years after trial). 
29. First, the pretrial requirement is
based on the questionable conclusion that
“challenges of the petit jury are treated the
same as challenges of the grand jury.” United
States v. Boulding, 412 Fed. App’x 798, 804
(6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation, citation,
and modification omitted); see also, e.g.,
United States v. Ballard, 779 F.2d 287, 295 (5th
Cir. 1986) (Rule 12(b) “requires that objec-
tions to such matters as the grand and petit
jury arrays must be raised by motion before
trial”). But challenges to the grand jury
address a “defect in the indictment,” a claim
that must be brought pretrial under the lan-
guage of Rule 12(b)(3). See Comm. Note to
Rule 12(b)(1) and (2) [now (2) and (3)]
(“Among the defenses and objections in this
group are the following: Illegal selection or
organization of the grand jury”); Davis v.
United States, 411 U.S. 233, 238 (1973) (“Rule
12(b)(2) [now 12(b)(3)] precludes untimely
challenges to grand jury arrays, even when
such challenges are on constitutional
grounds”). In contrast, challenges to the petit
jury do not challenge the indictment and so
arguably should not be required to be filed
pretrial under the rule. As it is clear that
grand jury challenges implicate the indict-
ment, it is undisputed that they must be filed
pretrial. Second, Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 33 should arguably allow for a
motion for a new trial based on newly dis-
covered evidence about defects in the jury
selection process. Courts, however, have
been reluctant to grant such motions on the
grounds that defendants could have discov-
ered such errors before trial. 
30. For exceptions to the general rule,
see Ambrose v. Booker, 684 F.3d 638, 649 (6th
Cir. 2012) (“In the ordinary case, fair cross-
section claims should be raised at jury selec-
tion. However, where the underrepresenta-
tion is as obscure as the one in this case —
due to a small minority population and a
small absolute disparity — a failure to object
must be excused.”); United States v. Greene,
971 F. Supp. 1117, 1137 (E.D. Mich. 1997)
(“[T]he plain language of Rule 12(b) clearly
does not require that constitutional chal-
lenges to the jury selection process must be
made prior to trial.”).
31. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(e). 
32. See Nina W. Chernoff, Wrong About
the Right: How Courts Undermine the Fair
Cross-Section Guarantee by Imposing Equal
Protection Standards, 64 HASTINGS L. J. 141
(Dec. 2012).
33. Test v. United States, 420 U.S. 28, 30
(1975). 
34. The standard for equal protection
violations was established in Castaneda v.
Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977) and the stan-
dard for fair cross-section violations
(described at Number 9 herein) was estab-
lished in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
35. See United States v. Gelb, 881 F.2d
1155, 1161 (2d Cir. 1989) (“While the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits underrepresenta-
tion of minorities in juries by reason of
intentional discrimination, [t]he Sixth
Amendment is stricter because it forbids
any substantial underrepresentation of
minorities, regardless of … motive.” (alter-
ations in original) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
36. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d at
WWW. N A C D L . O R G                                                          D E C E M B E R  2 0 1 3
F
A
IR
 C
R
O
S
S
-
S
E
C
T
IO
N
 C
H
A
L
L
E
N
G
E
S
25
940; see generally Chernoff, supra note 32.
37. See, e.g., Gelb, 881 F.2d at 1161; see
generally Chernoff, supra note 32.
38. Isaacs v. State, 386 S.E.2d 316, 324,
325 (Ga. 1989) (noting that defendant
“obtained the services of an expert to assist
him with his challenges to the jury array and
with the selection of the jury” and holding
that “in an appropriate case, based upon a
sufficient showing of need, the denial of
funds for expert assistance might violate
due process”).
39. Courts often comment on the qual-
ifications of experts in fair cross-section chal-
lenges and on the quality of the evidence
they present. Defense attorneys may there-
fore want to familiarize themselves with the
judicial assessment of potential experts
before obtaining expert services. 
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1867(f ) (emphasis
added).
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. Test, 420 U.S. at 30. 
43. Layton, 519 F. Supp. at 958 (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 1867(f )).
44. See United States v. Orlando-Figueroa,
229 F.3d 33, 41 (1st Cir. 2000) (“criminal defen-
dants have an absolute right to inspect jury
selection records”); United States v. Miller, 116
F.3d 641, 658 (2d Cir. 1997) (“a defendant
plainly has a right to discovery”); United
States v. Curry, 993 F.2d 43, 44 (4th Cir. 1993)
(defendant “entitled to inspect, reproduce,
and copy the master jury list to support a
motion for a new trial based upon a substan-
tial failure to comply with the provisions of
[the JSSA] in selecting the grand or petit
jury”); Gov’t of Canal Zone v. Davis, 592 F.2d
887, 889 (5th Cir. 1979) (“The Supreme Court’s
decision in [Test] is dispositive of the issue.”);
United States v. McLernon, 746 F.2d 1098, 1123
(6th Cir. 1984) (“The right to inspection
extends to all jury selection materials rele-
vant to a complete determination of whether
a grand or petit jury has in fact been selected
‘at random from a fair cross-section of the
community.’” (quoting Test, 420 U.S. at 30));
United States v. Kolibioski, 732 F.2d 1328, 1331
(7th Cir. 1984) (“Criminal defendants have the
unqualified right to inspect jury lists.”); United
States v. Stanko, 528 F.3d 581, 587 (8th Cir.
2008) (“‘a litigant has essentially an unquali-
fied right to inspect jury lists’”) (quoting Test,
420 U.S. at 30); United States v. Studley, 783
F.2d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The right to
inspect jury lists is essentially unqualified.”);
United States v. Lawson, 670 F.2d 923, 926
(10th Cir. 1982) (“The Supreme Court charac-
terizes a litigant’s right to inspect jury lists as
essentially unqualified.”); see also United
States v. Pritt, 458 Fed. App’x 795, 800, 2012 WL
265927, at *3 (11th Cir. 2012) (acknowledging
defendant’s right to be “given the requisite
material to ascertain the facts that, under our
precedent, are essential to his jury composi-
tion claims”); United States v. Hsia, 2000 WL
194982, *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 2000) (“defendant
therefore is entitled to inspect, reproduce
and copy records or papers related to the
selection of the grand jury, as authorized by
28 U.S.C. § 1867(f)”).
45. United States v. Royal, 100 F.3d 1019,
1025 (1st Cir. 1996) (emphasis added). 
46. Id. at 1025. 
47. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1867(d)); see,
e.g., Stanko, 528 F.3d at 587 (“A defendant
may not be denied this unqualified right
even when he fails to allege facts which
show a ‘probability of merit in the proposed
jury challenge, because grounds for chal-
lenges to the jury selection process may
only become apparent after an examination
of the records.”) (internal citation, quotation,
and modification omitted); Layton, 519 F.
Supp. at 958 (“No probability of merit need
be shown. To avail himself of this right of
access to otherwise nonpublic jury selection
records, a litigant need only allege that he is
preparing a motion challenging the jury
selection procedures. There is no doubt on
this point whatsoever.”) (citation omitted);
see also United States v. Marcano-Garcia, 622
F.2d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 1980); Curry, 993 F.2d 44;
Alden, 776 F.2d at 773, 774. 
48. Canal Zone, 592 F.2d at 889. 
49. Alden, 776 F.2d at 775. 
50. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 10 § 4513(b)
(“Records used in the selection process shall
not be disclosed, except … as necessary in
the preparation or presentation of a motion
challenging compliance with this chapter.”);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 612-23(d) (“The contents of
any records or papers used by the clerk in
connection with the selection process shall
not be disclosed, except … connection with
the preparation or presentation of a motion
[challenging the jury selection process]. …
The parties in a case may inspect, reproduce,
and copy the records or papers at all reason-
able times during the preparation and pen-
dency of a motion [challenging the jury selec-
tion process].”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 2-213(4)
(same); IND. CODE § 33-28-5-21(e) (same); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 27-09.1-12(4) (same); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14 § 1214 (party challenging jury
selection entitled to present “the testimony of
the jury commissioners or the clerk, any rele-
vant records and papers not public or other-
wise available used by the jury commission-
ers or the clerk and any other relevant evi-
dence”); MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-
409(d) (same); MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 813(b) (same);
MO. REV. STAT. § 494.465(2) (same); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78B-1-113(2) (same); W. VA. CODE § 52-1-
15(b) (same); Roddy v. Super. Ct., 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d
307, 322 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (“In investigating
whether a claim of an underrepresentative
jury selection process may exist, a defendant
has certain rights to discovery.”).
51. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
§ 8-409(c) (“On a showing that a party needs
access to a record to prepare for a hearing on
a motion pending under this section, a trial
judge may allow the party to inspect and
copy a record as needed to prepare.”); Lewis v.
State, 632 A.2d 1175, 1178 (Md. 1993) (recog-
nizing entitlement to discovery under state
statute); OR. REV. STAT. § 10.275 (1) (“A person
challenging a jury panel … must include a
request for access to the confidential records
in the motion challenging the jury panel. …
The request must: (a) Specify the purpose for
which the jury records are sought; and (b)
Identify with particularity the relevant jury
records sought to be released including the
type and time period of the records. (2) The
court may order release of the jury records if
the court finds that: (a) The jury records
sought are likely to produce evidence rele-
vant to the motion; and (b) Production of the
jury records is not unduly burdensome.”);
State v. Rogers, 55 P.3d 488, 493 (Or. 2002)
(“ORS 136.005(1) requires only that relator
allege facts that, if true, constitute a material
departure from the requirements of law. The
trial court impermissibly required relator to
prove that his motion would succeed to trig-
ger the statutory provisions governing
release of the jury records that may support
the motion.”). 
California represents an exception to
the general rule, as it imposes a “reasonable
belief” threshold showing requirement. See
People v. Jackson, 920 P.2d 1254, 1268 (Cal.
1996) (“[U]pon a particularized showing sup-
porting a reasonable belief that underrepre-
sentation in the jury pool or the venire exists
as the result of practices of systematic exclu-
sion, the court must make a reasonable
effort to accommodate the defendant’s rele-
vant requests for information designed to
verify the existence of such underrepresen-
tation and document its nature and
extent.”); Roddy, 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 322 (“A
reasonable belief is simply a conviction of
mind arising by way of inference, a belief
begotten by attendant circumstances, fairly
creating it, and honestly entertained.”)
(internal quotations, citations, and modifica-
tions omitted).
52. D.C. CODE § 11-1914(b).
53. Gause v. United States, 6 A.3d 1247
(D.C. 2010).
54. Id. at 1255.
55. Id. at 1256.
56. Test, 420 U.S. at 30 (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1861) (emphasis added).
57. Id. 
58. State v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 573 A.2d
944, 950 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1990); see, e.g., Royal,
100 F.3d at 1025 (unqualified right to discov-
ery because “without such access, a litigant
will be unable to determine whether he has
a meritorious claim”); Marcano-Garcia, 622
F.2d at 18 (court erred when denied “motion
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to inspect the court’s jury selection records,
and thus prevented [appellants] from estab-
lishing a factual basis for their motion to
strike the jury”); Alden, 776 F.2d at 775
(“Grounds for challenges to the jury selec-
tion process may only become apparent
after an examination of the records,” thus
“[e]ven if the defendant’s anticipated chal-
lenges to the jury selection process, as artic-
ulated at the time of his motion for inspec-
tion, are without merit, the defendant may
still inspect the jury records.”). 
59. Canal Zone, 592 F.2d at 890. 
60. See Ciba-Geigy Corp., 573 A.2d at 959
(noting that in Test, the “Court did not rest its
holding solely on § 1867(f ),” but also on the
statute’s purpose).
61. State ex rel. Garrett v. Saitz, 594
S.W.2d 606, 608 (Mo. 1980).
62. Id. 
63. Id.; see also Ciba-Geigy Corp., 573
A.2d at 946, 947, 950 (affirming grant of a dis-
covery request to defendants who claimed a
right to information “upon both federal and
state constitutional precepts” and
“reject[ing] the state’s contention that
defendants are entitled to the discovery
they seek only if they meet the good cause
standard,” as “[i]t would be virtually impossi-
ble for defendants who are endeavoring to
ascertain if a successful attack on the grand
jury selection process can be advanced if the
facts necessary to prove a defect in the
selection process are withheld”); Mobley v.
United States, 379 F.2d 768, 772 (5th Cir. 1967)
(granting right to discovery pursuant to con-
stitutional claim in case that arose prior to
the enactment of the JSSA).
64. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
65. 559 U.S. 314, 319 (2010). 
66. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364; see also
Berghuis, 559 U.S. at 319. 
67. Id. at 368.
68. Id. at 365.
69. See Taylor, 419 U.S. 522 (women);
Berghuis, 559 U.S. at 320 (applying fair cross-
section analysis to alleged underrepresenta-
tion of African-Americans); United States v.
Hernadez-Estrada, 704 F.3d 1015, 1022 (9th
Cir. 2012) (Hispanics).
70. United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 591
(10th Cir. 1976) (internal quotation and cita-
tion omitted); see also Ford v. Seabold, 841
F.2d 677, 681-82 (6th Cir. 1988); Willis v. Zant,
720 F.2d 1212, 1216 (11th Cir. 1983).
71. United States v. Yazzie, 660 F.2d 422,
426 (10th Cir. 1981) (Native Americans);
United States v. Gelb, 881 F.2d 1155, 1161 (2d
Cir. 1989) (Jews); United States v. Canady, 54
F.3d 544, 547 (9th Cir. 1995) (“This court and
the Supreme Court have repeatedly recog-
nized [African-Americans, Hispanics, and
Asians] to be ‘distinctive groups in the com-
munity.’”) (quoting Duren, 439 U.S. at 364);
see also People v. Garcia, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339,
347 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 2000) (gays and lesbians
constitute cognizable group for purposes of
equal protection claim).
72. See Sanjay K. Chhablani, Re-Framing
the ‘Fair Cross-Section’ Requirement, 13 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 931, 947 (2011).
73. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 n.1
(1989) (“The second prong of Duren is met
by demonstrating that the group is under-
represented in proportion to its position in
the community as documented by census
figures.”); see Duren, 439 U.S. at 365 (uphold-
ing the use of six-year-old census data in fair
cross-section challenge). The Supreme Court
has likewise relied on census data in decid-
ing equal protection challenges to the jury
selection process. See, e.g., Castaneda, 430
U.S. at 494 (considering “the proportion of
the group in the total population”) (empha-
sis added); Turner, 396 U.S. at 359 (evaluating
the percentage of African-Americans in “the
general [county] population”).
When evaluating census data, attor-
neys should bear in mind that the census
“undercounts” racial and ethnic minorities.
As the Supreme Court has recognized, “the
[Census] Bureau has always failed to reach
— and has thus failed to count — a portion
of the population. This shortfall has been
labeled the census ‘undercount.” Dep’t of
Comm. v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525
U.S. 316, 322, 322-23 (1999) (plurality). The
undercount has more severe implications
for racial and ethnic minorities that “have
historically had substantially higher under-
count rates than the population as a whole.”
Id.; see also Virginia v. Reno, 117 F. Supp. 2d 46,
48 (D.D.C. 2000) (“Studies by the Census
Bureau demonstrate that each census has
produced a net undercount of the popula-
tion and shown a higher ‘differential under-
count’ for ethnic and racial minorities. …”);
Carter v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 307 F.3d
1084 (9th Cir. 2002) (“It is generally accepted
that the decennial census results in a net
undercount of the population, particularly
with respect to minority and disadvantaged
groups.”) (footnote omitted); Chavez v. Illinois
State Police, 251 F.3d 612 (7th Cir. 2001) (“is
widely acknowledged that the Census fails
to count everyone, and that the undercount
is greatest in certain subgroups of the popu-
lation, particularly Hispanics and African-
Americans”). Courts can consider the under-
count when determining the degree of dis-
parity. See, e.g., United States v. Duran De
Amesquita, 582 F. Supp. 1326, 1330 n.5 (D.C.
Fla. 1984) (relying on the “general population
figure … derived from the 1980 U.S. Census,
adjusted for the generally recognized popu-
lation undercount”).
74. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d at
942 (but “where the record contains popula-
tion data broken down by age, the represen-
tativeness of the jury pool is to be compared
to this refined set of data for the purpose of
the defendant’s prima facie case under
Duren”); United States v. Rioux, 97 F.3d 648,
657 (2d Cir. 1996).
75. See, e.g., Azania v. State, 778 N.E.2d
1253, 1259 (Ind. 2002) (“Both the United
States Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts have repeatedly upheld the use of
census figures in constitutional assaults on
jury selection procedures.”). 
76. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d at 942.
77. See, e.g., Rioux, 97 F.3d at 657 (“We
conclude that the appropriate measure in
this case is the 18 and older subset of the
population, regardless of other qualifica-
tions for jury service.”); United States v.
Facchiano, 500 F. Supp. 896, 897 (D.C. Fla.
1980) (“Census data was used to determine
the number of whites and blacks aged 18-69
in the county’s population. It is judicially
noticed that within this population are a
number of individuals who are not qualified
to be jurors. …”); Lovell v. State, 702 A.2d 261,
280 n.8 (Md. 1997) (relying on 18 and older
subset of the population that includes
noncitizens, persons who do not speak
English, and institutionalized persons); see
also notes 77-79 infra. 
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in
Rodriguez-Lara represents one side of an
“intra-circuit conflict” in the Ninth Circuit “as
to whether a defendant who presents only
evidence that includes nonjury-eligible seg-
ments of the population may ever satisfy a
prima facie case.” United States v. Torres-
Hernandez, 447 F.3d 699, 704 (9th Cir. 2006).
Without resolving the conflict, subsequent
Ninth Circuit panels have held only that a
court must use jury-eligible data if and when
it is presented. See id. (declining to resolve
conflict and applying the principle that
“when presented with various types of data
to determine whether Hispanics are under-
represented on grand jury venires, a court
must rely on the statistical data that best
approximates the percentage of jury-eligi-
ble Hispanics in the district”); United States v.
Martinez-Orosco, 215 Fed. App’x 693, 695 (33,
1 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Our case law supports the
use of jury-eligible data when it is available
and presented to the court. We have not
endorsed community data in these circum-
stances.”) (emphasis added). See generally,
Stephen E. Reil, Comment: Who Gets
Counted? Jury List Representativeness for
Hispanics in Areas With Growing Hispanic
Populations Under Duren v. Missouri, 2007
B.Y.U. L. REV. 201 (2007).
78. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d at
943 n.9 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b))
“[w]hereas census data are readily accessi-
ble, jury-eligible population data will often
be quite hard for fair-cross-section claimants
to obtain, given the difficulty of sorting out
from the general population figures the
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number of individuals who (for example) are
not citizens, who are not fluent in English, or
who are ‘incapable, by reason of mental or
physical infirmity, to render satisfactory jury
service.’”); United States v. Shinault, 147 F.3d
1266, 1272 (10th Cir. 1998) (relying on census
data and noting “there is apparently no reli-
able measurement of that subset of the gen-
eral population” [“the portion of the general
population that is eligible to serve”]); United
States v. Osorio, 801 F. Supp. 966, 978 (D. Conn.
1992) (“data as to the population eligible for
jury service are rarely available”); United
States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 570 n.13 (1st Cir.
1970) (“It may be so difficult to obtain full
and accurate figures for ‘jury eligibles’ that to
require such figures would — at least in
some cases — place an insuperable burden
on defendant.”), overruled on other grounds,
Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982 (1st Cir. 1985);
State v. Lopez, 692 P.2d 370, 377 (Idaho App.
1984) (“Because of the difficulty in obtaining
more accurate figures for jury eligibility, the
defendant can present a prima facie case by
showing through the use of total population
figures a significant underrepresentation of
a cognizable class.”) (internal quotation, cita-
tion, and modification omitted).
79. See, e.g., United States v. Purdy, 946 F.
Supp. 1094, 1100 (D. Conn. 1996) (“[A] meas-
ure of community population which is
based [on] … the qualified voting age pop-
ulation … relies upon speculative estimates
regarding the proportion and makeup of
the population which satisfies the qualifica-
tions for jury service.”); United States v. Reyes,
934 F. Supp. 553, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (The
speculative nature of the data is due in part
to the fact that “[w]hile some juror qualifica-
tions are embodied in bright-line rules …
others require the exercise of judgment,”
and “whether someone has been convicted
of a felony … is virtually impossible to
track.”); Osorio, 801 F. Supp. at 978 (“[T]he
Court rejects the alternative use of regis-
tered voters as an appropriate benchmark.
Simply put, the government’s evidence does
not reliably establish that this alternative
benchmark would be a better estimate of
the jury-eligible population than the voter-
age population would be.”).
80. As the Ninth Circuit observed, “The
Supreme Court has subsequently reiterated
that ‘[t]he second prong of Duren is met by
demonstrating that the [distinctive] group is
underrepresented in proportion to its position
in the community as documented by census fig-
ures.’” Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d at 941 (quoting
Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 n.1 (emphasis added);
see also id. at 943 n.9 (“none of the Supreme
Court’s cases has … rejected a prima facie
showing of underrepresentation because of a
failure to provide statistics reflecting the dis-
tinctive group’s proportion in the jury-eligible
— as opposed to the general or age-eligible
— population.”); Shinault, 147 F.3d at 1272
(noting “defendant derived his population
data from the most recent census, a practice
that the Supreme Court has found adequate
in the past”); Ford v. Seabold, 841 F.2d 677 (6th
Cir. 1988) (rejecting government’s argument
that analysis was flawed where it failed to
compare “women in the jury pools to …
those eligible for jury service,” because “[i]n
Duren, the Court explicitly rejected this argu-
ment”); U.S. ex rel. Barksdale v. Blackburn, 610
F.2d 253, 262 (5th Cir. 1980) (“The Court made
it clear that the burden of reducing general
population statistics to more meaningful sta-
tistics rests on the State. …”) (citing
Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 488-89 n.8; Lopez, 692
P.2d at 377 (“the United States Supreme Court
knowingly has refrained from compelling
criminal defendants to compile jury-eligible
data in order to show prima facie violations of
the fair cross-section requirement.”).
81. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538 (emphasis
added).
82. See United States v. Green, 389 F.
Supp. 2d 29, 56 n.53 (D. Mass. 2005), overruled
on other grounds by In re United States, 426
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[T]he question is
whether the underrepresentation [is] ‘inher-
ent in the system used, rather than a product
of random factors on one particular jury
venire.’” (quoting Cynthia A. Williams, Note,
Jury Source Representativeness and the Use of
Voter Registration Lists, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 590,
617 (1990))).
83. Berghuis, 559 U.S. at 329.
84. See Kairys, Kadane & Lehoczky, Jury
Representativeness: A Mandate for Multiple
Source Lists, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 776, 793-94 (1977).
85. Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1231
(3d Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Yanez,
136 F.3d 1329, 1998 WL 44544, at *2 (5th Cir.
Jan. 26, 1998) (“Absolute disparity measures
the difference between the proportion of
the distinctive groups in the population
from which the jurors are drawn and the
proportion of the groups on the jury list.”).
86. See, e.g., United States v. Shinault,
147 F.3d 1266, 1273 (10th Cir. 1998) (“In
this circuit, absolute disparity is the start-
ing place for all other modes of compari-
son.”) (internal quotation, citation, and
modification omitted). 
87. See United States v. Royal, 174 F.3d 1,
8, 7 n.3 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing “[t]his court’s
choice of absolute disparity over compara-
tive disparity” but noting that “our endorse-
ment of one should not be taken as a state-
ment that it is the best of all possible
methodologies”); United States v. Sanchez-
Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 547 (9th Cir.1989) (“we
have consistently favored an absolute dis-
parity analysis and have rejected a compara-
tive disparity analysis”).
88. See, e.g., United States v. Chanthadara,
230 F.3d 1237, 1256 (10th Cir. 2000)
(“absolute disparities are of a limited value
when considering small populations”);
United States v. Rogers, 73 F.3d 774, 776-77
(8th Cir. 1996) (“Although utilizing the
absolute disparity calculation may seem
intuitive, its result understates the systematic
representative deficiencies; the percentage
disparity can never exceed the percentage of
African-Americans in the community.”);
United States v. Jackman, 46 F.3d 1240, 1247
(2d Cir. 1995) (“the absolute numbers
approach is of questionable validity when
applied to an underrepresented group that is
a small percentage of the total population”);
see also Berghuis, 559 U.S. at 330 n.4 (declin-
ing the government’s invitation to adopt the
absolute disparity test for cross-section
cases); Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d at 944 n.10.
89. Ramseur, 524 A.2d at 219. 
90. See, e.g., United States v. Weaver, 267
F.3d. 231, 243 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Because we
think that figures from both methods inform
the degree of underrepresentation, we will
examine and consider the results of both.”);
United States v. Chanthadara, 230 F.3d 1237,
1257 (10th Cir. 2000) (“We must consider
both absolute and comparative disparities
to determine whether a violation has
occurred.”); United States v. Yanez, 136 F.3d
1329, 1998 WL 44544, at *2 (5th Cir. Jan. 26,
1998) (“Although absolute disparity is an
appropriate method for dealing with jury
challenges, it is not the sole means that may
be used to establish unlawful jury discrimi-
nation.”); United States v. Rodriguez, 776 F.2d
1509, 1511 n.4 (11th Cir. 1985) (“the absolute
disparity method is not the sole means of
establishing unlawful jury discrimination”);
Washington v. People, 186 P.3d 594, 605 (Colo.
2008) (“We hold that no specific statistical
measure should be excluded in a court’s
analysis of a constitutional fair cross-section
claim, and that a court should evaluate all
the statistical evidence presented to deter-
mine whether the underrepresentation is
unfair and unreasonable in violation of the
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury
selected from a fair cross-section of the com-
munity.”); State v. Williams, 525 N.W.2d 538,
543 (Minn. 1994) (“We are unwilling to rely
solely upon the ‘absolute disparity’ approach
in interpreting the fair cross-section require-
ment. … Rather, courts should be free to use
all the statistical tools available, including
the absolute disparity figure, the compara-
tive disparity figure, standard deviations, and
any other such tools.”); State v. Ramseur, 524
A.2d 188, 222 (N.J. 1987) (“We will not, in this
case, choose one test over the others as the
best method for assessing the significance
of statistical evidence.”).
91. Ramseur, 983 F.2d at 1231-32.
92. Ramseur, 524 A.2d at 236.
93. Berghuis, 559 U.S. at 323.
94. Shinault, 147 F.3d at 1273.
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95. See note 90 supra.
96. Berghuis, 559 U.S. at 324 n.1. 
97. Waisome v. Port Auth. of New York and
New Jersey, 948 F.2d 1370, 1376 (2d Cir. 1991).
Note that these efforts by courts to describe
standard deviation analysis are a bit mis-
leading, as standard deviation analysis does
not compute the probability that the cog-
nizable class is proportionately represented,
but rather the probability, if it were propor-
tionately represented, that the observed dis-
crepancy would be as large or larger than
that observed.
98. See Ramseur, 983 F.2d at 1232.
99. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,
486 (1977).
100. See, e.g., People v. Bryant, 822
N.W.2d 124, 142 (Mich. 2012) (“no court in
the country has accepted [a standard-devia-
tion analysis] alone as determinative in Sixth
Amendment challenges to jury selection
systems.”) (internal quotation and citation
omitted).
101. Berghuis, 559 U.S. at 330 n.4.
102. Id. (quoting Brief for Respondent
35).
103. See Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 55 n.52
(“[T]he 10% rule adopted by some courts is a
contrivance, and one based on faulty prece-
dent.”); Waller v. Butkovich, 593 F. Supp. 942,
954 (M.D.N.C. 1984) (declining to adopt the
10% rule because “[w]hether a fair cross sec-
tion exists is entirely different from whether
intentional discrimination occurred”);
Washington, 186 P.3d at 602 n.6 (“the burden
of proof for establishing that the underrepre-
sentation is unfair and unreasonable in an
equal protection challenge is higher than it is
in a fair cross-section challenge.”).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Osorio, 801
F. Supp. 966, 974 (D. Conn. 1992)
(Representation was not fair and reasonable
where absolute disparity was “3.26% for
blacks (6.34% − 3.08%) and 4.30% for
Hispanics (5.07% − 0.77%).”).
105. See, e.g., United States ex rel.
Barksdale v. Blackburn, 639 F.2d 1115, 1126-
27 (5th Cir.1981) (representation on grand
jury fair and reasonable when absolute dis-
parity for African-Americans was 11.5%).
106. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364.
107. Id. at 366.
108. See, e.g., State v. Lopez, 692 P.2d 370,
377 (Idaho App. 1984) (holding that under-
representation was “systematic” where there
was evidence of disparity and it was undis-
puted that lists at each stage of jury selec-
tion “were constructed in accordance with
procedures routinely followed by the coun-
ty’s jury commissioners,” because “[t]he only
reasonable inference from this evidence is
that the underrepresentation of Hispanics
was inherent in those procedures”).
109. 559 U.S. 314 (2010).
110. Id. at 319.
111. Berghuis involved the application
of the limited standard of review under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which restricted the
Court’s analysis to the question of whether
the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision
“involved an unreasonable application of[]
clearly established federal law.” Id. at 320
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012)).
112. See id. at 332 (“No ‘clearly estab-
lished’ precedent of this Court supports
Smith’s claim that he can make out a prima
facie case merely by pointing to a host of fac-
tors that, individually or in combination,
might contribute to a group’s underrepresen-
tation.”). In making this demand for specifici-
ty, the 2010 Court seemed to be more
impressed with Duren’s evidence than the
1979 Court had been. For although Duren
“established when in the selection process
the systematic exclusion [of women] took
place,” he was not able to do so with particu-
larity. Duren, 439 U.S. at 366. Instead, Duren
narrowed the possibilities down to two
stages of the selection process. Id. at 366-67
(demonstrating with “statistics and other evi-
dence” that the disparity occurred either
when people were summoned for service or
when people showed up in court at the “final,
venire, stage”). The Court recognized that
Duren had not established which policy was
producing the disparity. Duren, 439 U.S. at 367
(explaining the disparity was due to either
“the automatic exemption for women or
other statutory exemptions”); id. at 369 (“The
other possible cause of the disproportionate
exclusion of women on Jackson County jury
venires is, of course, the automatic exemption
for women.”). Nonetheless, the Court con-
cluded the underrepresentation of women
“was quite obviously due to the system by
which juries were selected. …” Id. at 367.
113. For a detailed description of the
stages of jury selection, see NATL. JURY PROJECT
LITIGATION CONSULTING, JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC
TECHNIQUES (2d ed., West 2011-12).
114. See, e.g., People v. Ramirez, 139 P.3d
64, 94 (Cal. 2006); Azania v. State, 778 N.E.2d
1253, 1257-59 (Ind. 2002); People v. Bryant,
No. 241442, 2004 WL 513664, at *4 (Mich. Ct.
App. Mar. 16, 2004); United States v. Powell,
DAILY WASH. L. RPTR., Oct. 3, 2008, at 2149 (D.C.
Sup. Ct. Crim. June 17, 2008); State v. Long, 499
A.2d 264, 268 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div. 1985).
115. State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1, 44
(Tenn. 2010) (“[T]he increment used to draw
names from the driver’s license list changes
when a new venire is selected. These
changes have a significant effect on the
drawing of names from the list. … [A]ssum-
ing [the county’s] Hispanic population gen-
erally is at the end of the list because
Hispanics disproportionately have higher
driver’s license numbers … decreasing the
increment will have a tendency to increase
the possibility that Hispanics will not be con-
sidered for jury service.”).
116. See State v. LaMere, 2 P.3d 204, 221
(Mont. 2000) (noting that the use of the tele-
phone to summon jurors resulted in an
underrepresentative pool when 29% of
Native American households in one county
have no phone service, while “[i]n stark con-
trast … only 5% [of Anglo-American house-
holds in the same county] are without
phone service”); see also United States v.
Nakai, 413 F.3d 1019, 1022 (9th Cir. 2005).
117. See, e.g., People v. Jenkins, 997 P.2d
1044, 1100 (Cal. 2000); Spencer v. State, 545
So. 2d 1352, 1353-54 (Fla. 1989); Alvarado v.
State, 486 P.2d 891, 895 (Ala. 1971); People v.
Henderson, 490 N.Y.S.2d 94, 96-97 (Buffalo
City Ct.1985).
118. See, e.g., United States v. Cecil, 836
F.2d 1431, 1448 (4th Cir. 1988) (recognizing
that “the use of the voter registration lists
[has] been uniformly approved by the court
of appeals as the basic source for the jury
selection process” and citing cases); but see
United States v. Weaver, 267 F.3d 231, 244–45
(3d Cir. 2001) (“if the use of voter registration
lists over time did have the effect of sizably
underrepresenting a particular class or
group on the jury venire, then under some
circumstances, this would violate the Sixth
Amendment”); Bryant v. Wainwright, 686 F.2d
1373, 1378 n.4 (11th Cir. 1982) (“[I]f the use of
voter registration lists as the origin for jury
venires were to result in a sizeable underrep-
resentation of a particular class or group on
the jury venires, then this could constitute a
violation of a defendant’s ‘fair cross-section’
rights under the Sixth Amendment.”); see
also United States v. Ruiz-Castro, 92 F.3d 1519,
1527 (10th Cir. 1996) overruled on other
grounds by United States v. Flowers, 464 F.3d
1127 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Armsbury, 408 F. Supp. 1130, 1139 (D. Or.
1976). The cases rejecting claims based on
the use of voter lists as source lists are often
based on the erroneous importation of the
discrimination requirement of equal protec-
tion claims. See Chernoff, supra note 32;
Williams, supra note 82, at 629. 
119. United States v. McLernon, 746 F.2d
1098, 1123 (6th Cir. 1984).
120. The cases cited in this article are pri-
marily published opinions, but as many
orders granting discovery requests are
unpublished, defense attorneys will need to
examine unpublished orders in their jurisdic-
tion for the most up to date legal support.
Unpublished decisions can be cited for per-
suasive value, see FED. R. APP. P. 32(1)(a), and
current federal practice calls for lawyers to
acknowledge and address unpublished as
well as published opinions. See, e.g., Patrick J.
Schiltz, The Citation of Unpublished Opinions
in the Federal Court of Appeals, 74 FORDHAM L.
REV. 23, 43 (Oct. 2005) (“Lawyers, district court
WWW. N A C D L . O R G                                                                         T H E  C H A M P I O N30
F
A
IR
 C
R
O
S
S
-
S
E
C
T
IO
N
 C
H
A
L
L
E
N
G
E
S
judges, and appellate judges regularly read
and rely on unpublished decisions despite
prohibitions on doing so.”) (citation, quota-
tion, and modification omitted).
121. Saitz, 594 S.W.2d at 608. See United
States v. Savage, No. 07-550-03, 2013 WL
797417, at *4 (E.D. Pa. March 5, 2013) (granti-
ng access to “[s]preadsheets with statistical
breakdowns by race and ethnicity” for jurors
on the master wheel, qualified wheel, who
were summoned, and who served); see also
United States v. Patel, No. 11-CR-20468, 2012
WL 1959563, at *5 (E.D. Mich. May 30, 2012);
McLernon, 746 F.2d at 1123; United States v.
Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev., 2007 WL
1452489, at *1-2 (N.D. Tex. May 15, 2007);
United States v. Diaz, 236 F.R.D. 470, 477 (N.D.
Cal. 2006); United States v. Montini, 2003 WL
22283892, * at 1 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 3, 2003);
State v. Matthews, 724 So. 2d 1140, 1143 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1998). 
122. Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 781
N.E.2d 1253, 1268 (Mass. 2003).
123. See, e.g., Miller, 116 F.3d at 658;
United States v. Percival, 756 F.2d 600, 614 (7th
Cir. 1985); Test, 550 F.2d at 581; Savage, 2013
WL 797417, at *5; United States v. Friel, 2006
WL 2061395, at *2 (D. Me. July 21, 2006);
Montini, 2003 WL 22283892, at *3; United
States v. Jones, 1998 WL 160857, at *3 (D. Kan.
Feb. 27, 1998); United States v. Ailsworth, 1994
WL 539347, at *24 (D. Kan. 1994); United
States v. Van Pelt, 1993 WL 23730, at *9 (D.
Kan. Jan. 13, 1993); United States v. Carlock,
606 F. Supp. 491, 493 (W.D. La.1985); Bailey v.
State, 493 A.2d 396, 400 (Md. App. 1985).
124. See, e.g., Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d
1215, 1230 (3d Cir. 1992); Commonwealth v.
Aponte, 462 N.E.2d 284, 287 (Mass. 1984);
Ciba-Geigy Corp., 573 A.2d at 945.
125. See, e.g., Test, 420 U.S. at 29; Curry,
993 F.2d at 44; McLernon, 746 F.2d at 1123;
Test, 550 F.2d at 581; Thomas v. Borg, 159
F.3d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1998); Savage, 2013
WL 797417, at *5; Patel, 2012 WL 1959563,
at *5; United States v. Rice, 489 F. Supp. 2d
1312, 1318 (S.D. Ala. 2007); Diaz, 236 F.R.D.
at 481; United States v. Gotti, 2004 WL
2274712, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2004); United
States v. Causey, 2004 WL 1243912, at *13
(S.D. Tex. May 25, 2004); Jones, 1998 WL
160857, at *3; Ailsworth, 1994 WL 539347, at
*24; Van Pelt, 1993 WL 23730, at *9; Carlock,
606 F. Supp. at 493; United States v. Fieger,
No. 07-20414, 2008 WL 1902054, at *7 (E.D.
Mich., Apr. 29, 2008).
126. See, e.g., Savage, 2013 WL 797417,
at *5; Test, 550 F.2d at 581; Rice, 489 F. Supp.
2d at 1318; Diaz, 236 F.R.D. at 481; Causey,
2004 WL 1243912, at *13; Jones, 1998 WL
160857, at *3; Ailsworth, 1994 WL 539347, at
*24; Van Pelt, 1993 WL 23730, at *9; Carlock,
606 F. Supp. at 493; Thomas, 159 F.3d at 1149.
127. See, e.g., Rice, 489 F. Supp. 2d at
1318; Holy Land, 2007 WL 1452489, at *1-2;
United States v. Shapiro, 994 F. Supp. 146, 147
(E.D. N.Y. 1998).
128. People v. Taylor, 191 Misc. 2d 672,
677 (N.Y. Sup. 2002); see also State v. Russo,
516 A.2d 1161, 1165 (N.J. Super. L. 1986).
129. See, e.g., Savage, 2013 WL 797417,
at *5; Holy Land, 2007 WL 1452489, at *1-2;
Causey, 2004 WL 1243912, at *16.
130. People v. Buford, 132 Cal. App. 3d 288,
299 (Cal. App. 1. Dist. 1982); see also United
States v. Calabrese, 942 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1991).
131. See, e.g., Savage, 2013 WL 797417,
at *5; Holy Land, 2007 WL 1452489, at *1-2;
Diaz, 236 F.R.D. at 481; Montini, 2003 WL
22283892, at *3; United States v. Hsia, 2000 WL
194982, at *1 (D.D.C. 2000).
132. See, e.g., United States v. Williams,
2007 WL 1223449, at *6 (D. Haw. April 23,
2007); Holy Land, 2007 WL 1452489, at *1;
Carlock, 606 F. Supp. at 494.
133. See, e.g. Miller, 116 F.3d at 658;
United States v. Harvey, 756 F.2d 636, 643 (8th
Cir. 1985); Mobley, 379 F.2d at 773; Thomas,
159 F.3d at 1149; United States v. Scrushy,
2007 WL 1296000, at *1 n.4 (M.D. Ala. 2007);
United States v. Royal, 7 F. Supp. 2d 96, 99 (D.
Mass. 1998).
134. Causey, 2004 WL 1243912, at *15.
135. Arriaga, 781 N.E.2d at 1268. 
136. See Rice, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 1324.
Courts can require the defendant’s expert to
provide an affidavit of confidentiality before
accessing confidential juror information.
Savage, 2013 WL 797417, at *5. Courts also
often circumscribe the use of disclosed
information without executing a formal pro-
tective order. See, e.g., Causey, 2004 WL
1243912, at *15.
137. Canal Zone, 592 F.2d at 889; see also
United States v. McLernon, 746 F.2d 1098,
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1123 (6th Cir. 1984) (“We can certainly envi-
sion a situation in which a defendant must
be afforded access to the names, addresses,
and demographics of those jurors who
returned the indictment in order to vindi-
cate the “unqualified” right to inspection and
to insure that the jury actually represented a
wide spectrum of the community.”); Ciba-
Geigy Corp., 573 A.2d at 945 (affirming order
“which authorizes the mailing of a question-
naire on the court’s stationery to each of the
575 members of State Grand Juries 171-195,
requesting recipients to identify their race
and ethnic background”).
138. AO-12 is not listed in the website of
the Administrative Office of the Courts.
Available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
FormsAndFees/Forms/CourtForms.aspx (last
visited May 22, 2012).
139. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(a) (“Each district
court shall submit a report on the jury selec-
tion process within its jurisdiction to the
Administrative Office of the United States
Courts in such form and at such times as the
Judicial Conference of the United States may
specify.”) “According to instructions provided
by the Administrative Office on the form, the
AO–12 form ‘is required to be completed
upon ... [t]he periodic refilling of the master
wheel. …’” United States v. Hernandez-Estrada,
No. 10cr0558 BTM, 2011 WL 1119063, at *11
(S.D. Cal. March 25, 2011) (quoting Form AO–
12: Jury Representativeness Statistics, Data
Collection Instructions, General). A blank copy
of this form can be found in Appendix A of N.
Cherno & J.B. Kadane, Preempting Jury
Challenges: Strategies for Courts and
Administrators, 33 JUST. SYS. J. 47 (2011).
140. United States v. Fieger, No. 07-20414,
2008 WL 1902054, at *7 (E.D. Mich., Apr. 29,
2008) (ordering that “Defendant will be pro-
vided the information contemplated under
Administrative Order No. 00-AO-060 — juror
number, race, and Hispanic ethnicity — for (i)
the entire pool of 250 potential jurors to
whom summonses were issued in this case) ,
and (ii) the last 15 venires drawn by the Clerk
of the Court for the Detroit division”);
Hernandez-Estrada, 2012 WL 6054775, at *3
(defendant “had access to all AO-12s dating
back to 1999, including the AO-12 for the
2009 wheel, from which his grand and petit
juries were selected”).
141. See, e.g., United States v. Hernadez-
Estrada, 704 F.3d 1015, 1022 (9th Cir. 2012)
(recognizing that the district “has been
derelict in completing the AO-12s on time”).
142. See, e.g., Hernadez-Estrada, 704 F.3d
at 1024 (The “percentages of those in the
qualified wheel who did not answer the race
and ethnicity questions — 11.56% and
33.81% respectively — are significant.”). One
reason for the missing data may be the guid-
ance given by the Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts. According to L. Downey, Chief
Deputy Clerk of the U.S. District Court of the
Eastern District of Washington, “A missing or
incomplete answer to either Question 10a
(Race), Question 10b (Ethnicity) or Question
11 (Sex) is not sufficient reason to return the
form” and that instead, “if sampled names
include some jurors who did not answer the
race question, they would be counted in the
AO-12 report in the “Unknown” column.”
Email correspondence with authors, June 18,
2013. (This guidance was confirmed by tele-
phone with Ed Juel of the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts.) In this respect, the
Administrative Office’s guidance is inconsis-
tent with the JSSA, which requires that where
“it appears that there is an omission, ambigu-
ity, or error in a form, the clerk or jury com-
mission shall return the form with instruc-
tions to the person to make such additions or
corrections as may be necessary and to
return the form to the clerk or jury commis-
sion within 10 days.” 28 U.S.C. § 1864(a). The
Ninth Circuit has suggested that if the num-
ber of unknowns continues to be as signifi-
cant, it could “affect the legality” of the jury
selection system. Hernadez-Estrada, 704 F.3d
at 1024-25.
143. Duren, 439 U.S. at 367. 
144. 778 N.E.2d 1253 (Ind. 2002); see also
J.B. Kadane, (2002) Anatomy of a Jury
Challenge, Chance, 15, 2:10-13, reprinted in
STATISTICS IN THE LAW, J.B. Kadane, ed., (2008).
145. 778 N.E.2d at 1255.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1260.
149. A somewhat similar issue arose in
United States v. Osorio, 801 F. Supp. 966 (D.
Conn. 1992), in which computer errors
resulted in the exclusion of all potential
jurors from Hartford and New Britain. The
two largest cities in the division, they con-
tained 62.93% of the voting age Black popu-
lation and 68.09% of the voting age
Hispanics. See also United States v. Jackman,
42 F.3d 1240 (2d Cir. 1995).
150. 778 N.E.2d at 1261. The judge ruled
against the recusal motion and the Indiana
Supreme Court held the ruling was not
clearly erroneous. Id.
151. Dr. Joseph Kadane thought this
was the stronger ground.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1262 (quoting California v.
Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983)).
154. 499 A.2d 264 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law. Div.
1985). This was another case in which Dr.
Joseph Kadane, co-author of this article, was
hired as an expert statistician.
155. Id. at 265.
156. For more information, see
PHILADELPHIA FREEDOM by David Kairys (2008).
157. Id. at 271. An interesting procedural
issue developed in this case when the trial
judge consolidated similar pending motions
from other trials. 499 A.2d at 265. The
Appellate Division supported the consolida-
tion, but ruled that prosecutors could oppose
jury challenges in other cases on the ground
of timeliness. Id. When the jury challenge was
upheld, the issue arose regarding whether it
applied retroactively to all cases, perhaps all
capital cases, that had been heard in Atlantic
County using what had then been ruled an
unlawful jury system. Finding that a retro-
spective ruling would “create chaos, wreak
havoc and cause pandemonium in the crimi-
nal justice system,” the Superior Court, Law
Division (Criminal) decided that the opinion
would be applied only prospectively. Id. at
273. This experience suggests that when a
jury challenge is led in a jurisdiction, it would
be wise for all other defendants to make a
timely motion, asking for consolidation. Thus,
a favorable decision, if one comes, would
apply to all such cases. This also puts pressure
on the court hearing the evidence to move
swiftly, and may increase the chance of a suc-
cessful challenge. n
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